between class position and voting behavior is a natural and expected association in the Western democracies for a number of reasons: the existence of class interests, the representation of these interests by political parties, and the regular association of certain parties with certain interests. Given the character of the stratification order and the way political parties act as representatives of different class interests, it would be remarkable if such a relation were not found." 15 When Clark and Lipset sparked the so-called Death of Class Debate in 1991, 16 they did so by demonstrating that between 1947 and 1986 the Alford index had decreased in all the countries they had data on: Sweden, Great Britain, West Germany, France and the United
States. Clark and Lipset were subsequently critiqued by Hout et al., 17 who rejected their conclusions and argued for the need to use more fine-grained class distinctions than the crude manual-non-manual dichotomy and to rely on log-odds-ratios. Such a revision leaves the Alford index theoretically intact, however, because the resulting kappa 'index' still boils down to the idea that the degree to which class drives the vote can be measured as the strength of the bivariate relationship between class and voting. It is indeed telling that Nieuwbeerta's extremely large-scale study of between-country and over-time variations in class voting, 18 covering no less than twenty western countries, has not only demonstrated that the relationship between class and voting has decreased in most of these countries since World War II, but also that the 'kappa index' as proposed by Hout 21 but also by a variety of researchers who have contributed chapters to the two principal edited volumes that have been published about the Death of Class Debate: The End of Class Politics? 22 and The Breakdown of Class Politics. 23 
The Vagaries of the Alford Index
And yet, the measurement of class voting as the strength of the bivariate relationship between class position and voting behavior is highly debatable from a theoretical point of view. Its shortcoming is that it does not actually ascertain the validity of its key assumption: that it is indeed class-based desires for economic redistribution (among the working-class) and aversion to such a policy (among the middle-class) that drive voting behavior. This assumption is not so much plainly wrong, but rather one-sided. As it happens, it is not only economic liberalism / conservatism, rooted in people's economic class positions, that drive the vote, but also political values that relate to issues of individual liberty or maintenance of social order: social conservatism / social liberalism. 24 25 As is well known, among the public at large basically no relationship exists between these two value domains. 26 The point is not that social conservatism / social liberalismis empirically unrelated to the distinction between manual and non-manual occupations, of course. It obviously is. Ever since Lipset addressed working-class social conservatism in the 1950s 27 and Inglehart middle-class postmaterialism in the 1970s, 28 the circumstance that it is not the working-class, but rather the middle-class that stands out as politically progressive when it comes to these 'cultural' or 'non-economic' values, has often been taken to indicate class differences. In
Lipset's classical formulation: "Economic liberalism refers to the conventional issues concerning redistribution of income, status, and power among the classes. The poorer everywhere are more liberal or leftist on such issues (...) On the other hand, when liberalism is defined in non-economic terms -so as to support, for example, civil rights for political dissidents, civil rights for ethnic and racial minorities, internationalist foreign policies, and liberal immigration legislation -the correlation is reversed." 29 
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This can however not simply be taken to indicate that social conservatism / social liberalism, just like economic liberalism / conservatism, can be explained from one's class position. From a theoretical point of view, after all, class constitutes a shared economic position that determines life chances in general and income in particular. Indeed, the ability of newly composed class schemas to explain income differences is typically considered the litmus test for their validity and explanatory power, 30 with income differences between classes regarded solid evidence for the continued existence of classes in the classical Marxist sense of Klassen an sich rather than Klassen für sich. 31 Given this close link between class and income, it is quite significant that income does not affect social conservatism at all. Any number of studies points out that it is not so much those with low incomes who are social conservative, but rather those who are poorly educated. The other way around, it is not the rich, but the well educated who invariably turn out to be less social conservative, more tolerant to non-conformists, and less racially prejudiced. 32 In other words: if we conceive of classes as occupational categories that obviously differ strongly with respect to education, too, we should not be surprised to find a 'working-class' that is more economically liberal and social conservative than the middleclass, but this does not mean that economic liberalism / conservatism and social conservatism / social liberalism can both be explained from class in an economic sense. 38 others that education reduces social conservatism through an increase in cognitive complexity, 39 and yet others that education only reduces social conservatism in liberal-democratic societies, where education instills democratic values. 40 Which of these interpretations actually hold, and whether they actually exclude one another or can perhaps be synthesized into an overarching theory, are questions that go way beyond the purposes of the present paper. The vital point to underscore is simply that all of these interpretations boil down to the position that education does not operate as a vessel for classbased economic interests, but rather as a cultural resource that deeply affects people's worldview. Precisely because this cultural dimension of education is at stake here, it needs to be distinguished as 'cultural capital' from class in an economic sense. Our position, in short, is that education cannot be taken to indicate class just like that -it can when the explanation of economic liberalism is at stake, but it cannot when we are dealing with the explanation of social conservatism / social liberalism.
And yet, sociologists have always tended to combine occupation, education, and income into measures of socio-economic status or occupational class. The circumstance that Erik Wright's neo-Marxist class measures, 41 which are not based on occupational categories, hardly affect social conservatism has even been taken to indicate that they are invalid. 42 In fact, however, it is precisely this failure to explain social conservatism -just like income, but 9 unlike education -that underscores that they are actually more valid than the widely-used 44 The latter type of voting needs to be distinguished from the former, because it is driven by a cultural rather than an economic voting motivation, stems from cultural capital rather than class in an economic sense, and cross pressures the electorate to vote contradictory to its class-based economic interests. a failure to distinguish cultural voting from class voting tends to produce a serious underestimation of the latter. 45 Failing to make this distinction can even produce the flawed conclusion that "class voting has declined" when it has in fact increased. This occurs when class voting and cultural voting have both increased, but the latter more so than the former.
It is not clear at all, in short, whether the decline of the familiar alignment of the working-class with the left and the middle-class with the right since World War II, convincingly documented by Nieuwbeerta, has really been caused by a decline in class voting. It is certainly possible that it has, but it may also have been caused by an increase in cultural voting. And indeed, three sets of research findings point in the direction of the latter possibility.
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Firstly, and contradicting the claim of a decline in class voting, Stonecash has demonstrated that the relationship between income and voting behavior has become stronger rather than weaker in the United States since World War II. 46 Research by Brooks and Brady has also pointed out that income differences have not at all become less electorally consequential in the United States. 47 "Rather than class divisions fading in relevance, they are likely to be a staple of American politics for some time," Stonecash rightly concludes on the basis of this evidence. 48 Conclusions about whether or not class voting has declined thus seem strongly dependent on whether class is measured as income or as occupational class.
And indeed, this is not a trivial difference, as our discussion above has pointed out. Income categories, unlike occupational categories, are after all not susceptible to the problem of mixing up class voting and cultural voting, because no relationship exists between income and social conservatism / social liberalism. With these two operationalizations of class producing such radically different findings, the decline of the traditional class-party alignments that Nieuwbeerta has demonstrated more likely denotes an increase in cultural voting than a decline in class voting.
Secondly, if a decline in class voting had taken place since World War II, we would expect that class issues would have become less politically salient during this period. This is not the case, however, 49 but it is equally clear that cultural issues of individual liberty and social order have become more salient during this period. 50 Moreover, the salience of class issues proves not to affect the strength of the relationship between class and voting at all, whereas this relationship is substantially weaker in periods and countries in which cultural issues are more salient. 51 This suggests, again, that we have not been witnessing a decline in class voting, but rather an increase in cultural voting since World War II.
Thirdly, and perhaps even more significant, class analysis proves remarkably impotent in predicting the periods and countries in which the relationship between class and voting is weakest. Hypotheses derived from the class approach to politics, predicting the circumstances under which class distinctions are more or less salient, are rejected almost without exception. 52 If differences in the bivariate relationship between class and voting are taken to indicate differences in levels of class voting, those findings are obviously very surprising. Although it is of course conceivable that the class approach to politics is completely flawed, we consider it more likely that differences in the bivariate relationship between class and voting indicate differences in levels of cultural voting instead. If this is the case -and this is precisely what the two other clusters of findings that we have just discussed suggest -, the failure of hypotheses derived from the class approach to politics ceases to be surprising.
To Table 1 ). Class -Like Nieuwbeerta, we measure class by means of the EGP class schema, which assigns seven different class positions on the basis of occupation, supplemented with self-14 employed status and number of people supervised. 54 It is important to emphasize that the seven EGP classes do not constitute a simple hierarchy. 55 The three non-manual classes (higher professionals, lower professionals, and non-manual workers) and the three manual ones constitute two separate hierarchies, to be sure, but the hierarchical relationship between these two is undetermined. The same goes for the relationship between each of those hierarchies and the petty bourgeoisie. The higher professionals, the lower professionals, and the petty bourgeoisie can be classified unambiguously as middle-class, while the classes of skilled manual workers on the one hand and semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers on the other together constitute the working-class. The third and most privileged manual class constitutes "a latter-day aristocracy of labour or a 'blue collar' élite". 56 It consists of lowergrade technicians and supervisors of manual workers and can as such be distinguished from the 'real' working-class. Likewise, the least privileged non-manual class, i.e., that of nonmanual workers, can be distinguished from the 'real' middle-class as consisting of "whitecollar proletarians". 57 In interpreting the statistical results, in short, especially the voting behavior of the higher professionals, lower professionals, and petty bourgeoisie on the one hand ('middle-class') and the skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers on the other ('working-class') is important. EGP class is entered into the analysis as a series of six dummy variables, using the higher professionals as the reference category.
Income -Following Erikson, 58 net household income is used to determine income levels. To allow for a comparison of the strength of the regression coefficient for income with those of the other variables, this variable has been standardized first for each country and year combination separately.
Education -To standardize the educational classifications in the 15 countries, education has first been recoded into the number of years minimally required to attain the level of education at hand and has next been standardized in the same way as income.
Voting behavior -like Nieuwbeerta, 59 we have used data about the party one would vote for if elections were held today (or soon), about the party one has voted for in the past, and the party one identifies with. If valid answers to all of these three questions were 61 it needs no further argument that this decision produces a less dramatic decline of the relationship between class and voting than has actually occurred.
Results
We apply multilevel regression analysis, conceiving of country, year, and respondent as three different levels of analysis. To safeguard readability, we display only the coefficients that are relevant for our argument in the main text; the full tables can be found in the Appendix.
Before testing our two hypotheses, we demonstrate that EGP class, education, and income are related in ways that make EGP class too ambiguous a variable in the study of class voting. Table 2 points out that substantial income differences exist between the seven EGP classes (Model 1). The class of higher professionals has the highest average income and the classes of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled manual workers the lowest. In Model 2 we included education as a an independent. Its strong and positive coefficient shows there is a clear relationship: the highly educated earn higher incomes.
Although this positive relationship between education and income is not surprising in itself, of course, it strongly reduces the income differences between the manual classes and the higher professionals, indicating that the seven classes differ strongly with respect to both income and education. This makes EGP class too ambiguous a variable for the study of class 16 voting, because whereas income and education both drive class voting, as we have argued above, it is education alone that constitutes the driving force behind crosscutting cultural voting. Hence, to prevent an underestimation of class voting due to the use of an occupational class measure, one should at least statistically control for educational differences between these classes so as to eliminate crosscutting cultural voting from the measurement of class voting. Using rightist-voting as the dependent variable and six EGP class dummies as the independent ones, we next turn to the relationship between EGP class and voting behavior and the way this relationship has changed in the postwar era. It is evident that the skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers vote for leftist parties more often than the middle-class given their strong negative coefficients (Table 3 , Model 1).
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In Model 2 we entered cross-level interaction effects. The effects of these multiplications of EGP classes with 'year' demonstrate that the traditional alignments between class and voting have weakened across time. The positive and significant coefficients for the skilled workers and semi and unskilled workers point out that, compared to the middle-class, these classes have increasingly come to vote for rightist parties since World War II. This is not a surprising finding, of course. It is merely a replication of the principal finding of Nieuwbeerta's aforementioned study (which is based on the same data)
on which so much of the newly grown consensus in political sociology about a decline in class voting is based. This decline in the relationship between EGP class and voting behavior cannot be interpreted as indicating a decline in class voting just like that, however, as Table 4 points out.
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The positive and significant coefficients for income and education in Model 1 indicate that those with high incomes and those with high levels of education are more inclined to vote for rightist parties, which is of course consistent with the class theory of voting.
However, both of those relationships have changed across time, albeit in radically different directions. The significant cross-level interactions of education and income with year (Models 2 and 3) point out that those with low levels of education have come to vote more rightist, while those with low incomes have come to vote more leftist across the years: both coefficients are significant, but while the former is negative, the latter is positive. 1 9 5 6 1 9 5 8 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 Obviously, the increasing tendency of the working-class to vote for rightist parties cannot be explained from the increase in class voting, i.e., the increasing tendency of those with low incomes to vote for parties on the left (Table 5 , Model 2). In comparison to Model 1, which reproduces the decline in class voting already shown in Table 3 , the working-class still proves to have come to vote more rightist since World War II after income is included in the analysis. This means that our first hypothesis is rejected: the decline of the relationship between occupational class and voting behavior has not been caused by a decline in class voting, i.e., a decline of the tendency of those with low incomes to vote for parties on the left and those with high incomes to vote for parties on the right.
As expected, however, the increase in cultural voting, i.e., the increased tendency of those with low levels of education to vote for rightist parties, accounts for most of the shift of the working-class towards rightist parties (Model 3). The coefficient for the class of semi and unskilled workers falls into non-significance, while that for the class of skilled workers 22 declines once voting on the basis of level of education is controlled for. Controlling for cultural voting, then, the relationship between EGP class and voting behavior since World War II hardly declines anymore. This confirms our second hypothesis: the decline of the relationship between EGP class and voting behavior has been caused by an increase in cultural voting -a decrease in the tendency of the well educated to vote for parties on the right and the poorly educated to vote for parties on the left. What Stonecash has already demonstrated for the United States applies more generally: class voting has not declined during the postwar era, but has even become stronger. The suggestion to the contrary has been informed by studies of the development of the bivariate relationship between occupation-based class categories (especially the EGP class schema) and voting behavior. As it happens, this type of class measure inevitably and wrongly mixes up class voting, driven by class-based economic interests, and reverse cultural voting, driven by a cultural dynamics that is instead rooted in educational differences. It as such precludes valid conclusions as to whether or not the decline of the familiar alignments denotes a decline in class voting or an increase in cultural voting.
Our findings, relying on income to indicate class more validly, and acknowledging the double role of education in driving class voting as well as reverse cultural voting, leave little to the imagination. The gradual erosion of the pattern of a leftist-voting working-class and a rightist-voting middle-class has been caused by an increase in crosscutting cultural voting, driven by a cultural dynamics that is rooted in educational differences. Class voting, measured more validly by using income categories, has not declined, but has in fact become even stronger in the postwar era.
The intellectual consensus that has emerged since Clark and Lipset sparked the Death of Class Debate in the beginning of the 1990s does not hold that class is actually dead, to be sure, but rather that it is dying a slow -and perhaps painful -death. Our findings necessitate a critical reassessment of this consensus, because they point out that there is nothing "dead"
or "dying" about class. We feel it is more apt to say that class has been buried alive under the increasing weight of cultural voting, systematically misinterpreted as a decline in class voting due to an invalid measurement practice that has become an intellectual routine since Alford's pioneering work in the 1960s. As a lamentable consequence, poor old class now suffers its undeserved and horrid fate, "with thoughts of the air and grass above, with memory of dear friends who would fly to save us if but informed of our fate, and with consciousness that of this fate they can never be informed". 63 Disentangling class voting and cultural voting more 24 carefully in future empirical research is necessary to save class from this "most terrific of the ghastly extremes of agony". 64 25
Appendix
In order not to lose ourselves in statistical details, we have chosen to report only the most relevant parts of the Tables 2, 3 , 4, and 5 in the main text and to present the full tables in this Appendix. We apply multilevel modeling, because people in a particular context (country/year) are likely to be more similar than people in different contexts. Multilevel analysis enables splitting up the variance of the dependent variable. This is done in the null model of Table 2 , which demonstrates that only a small proportion of the variance of the dependent variable (income) is situated at the country level (0.77), followed by the year level Multilevel regression models are always constructed in such a way that any modification to the model must yield a reduction in deviance. Given the differences in degrees of freedom and deviance, as compared to the previous model, it can be tested (using the chi-square distribution) whether or not the new model fits the data better than the previous one. In Table 2 , the inclusion of the class indicators (Model 1) renders a reduction of 8,254.8. With a difference of 6 degrees of freedom, this is a highly significant improvement as compared to the null model.
After including the class dummies in the first model, the unexplained variance at the individual level drops from 5.41 to 4.95. This means that 8.5% of the income differences can be explained by the class dummies. Note, however, that neither in this model, nor in the next one, the unexplained variances at the country and year level decrease -which is logical, of course, because only individual-level independent variables are introduced in these models.
In the final model education is introduced, again rendering a significant decrease in deviance (from 415,616 to 410,698) and a decrease in unexplained variance at the individual level.
Full Full Table 3 also estimates multilevel models, because the dependent variable (rightist-voting behavior by individual respondents) is again nested within countries and years. Again, variances of the dependent variable are estimated. There is an important difference from the analysis reported in Table 2 , however, because in these models the effects of class are randomized. Model 1 investigates whether the effects of class vary across periods and countries -especially the former should be the case, because our starting point is that the effect of class declines. From Model 1 it can be seen that, indeed, many of the slopes of the 27 class dummies vary significantly across time and between countries. By introducing interaction effects with year, Model 2 attempts to explain away some of the variance of these class effects. This model points out that the country-level variances of the slopes of the class dummies remain intact. The year-level variances of the slopes of the two working-classes, however, decline after including the significant interaction effects. Note, however, that not all year-level variance is explained away by the inclusion of the interaction effects. This means that much of the remaining across-time variance of the class effect is non linear, pointing at national idiosyncrasies when it comes to the relationship between class position and voting behavior. Because our principal concern in the current paper is the general decline of the latter relationship, we do not go into these national idiosyncrasies any further. The full Tables 4 and 5 investigate whether the effects of education and income (full Tables 4 and 5) and class (full Table 5 ) on voting behavior vary significantly between countries and across time. These tables demonstrate that these preconditions for testing whether these effects increase or decrease across time are indeed met. According to the same logic as used in Table 3 , these tables also demonstrate that these effects decline after the introduction of interaction effects with year.
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